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 Was the 2007-2008 global financial crisis (the “financial crisis”) the 
cause of credit unavailability, or was it the effect? The standard story is that 
the financial crisis resulted in the loss of credit availability.3 I will argue 
                                                 
1 Copyright ©2016 by Steven L. Schwarcz. This is the Keynote Address of the University 
of Durham/Newcastle University symposium, “The Untold Stories of the Financial 
Crisis: the Challenge of Credit Availability,” sponsored by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) of the United Kingdom.  
2 Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law; 
Founding Director, Duke Global Financial Markets Center; Senior Fellow, the Centre for 
International Governance Innovation. E-mail: schwarcz@law.duke.edu. I thank Doneene 
Damon, Oonagh Fitzgerald, Vicki Tucker, and participants in the symposium referenced 
supra note 1 for valuable comments and Michael P. Sweeney for excellent research 
assistance. 
3 Cf. N. Orkun Akseli, Introduction, in AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS IN A TIME OF CRISIS 2 (2013; N. Orkun Akseli, ed.) (referring to “the 
global financial crisis and ensuing credit crunch”); Ari Aisen & Michael Franken, Bank 
Credit During the 2008 Financial Crisis: A Cross-Country Comparison (International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper 10/47, 2010), at 3, available at 
 Credit Unavailability.docxCredit Unavailability.docx 
2 
today that story is reversed. I will also examine what lessons that can teach 
us. 
 
 I. CAUSE AND EFFECT 
 
 To best assess cause and effect, consider the timeline of events 
leading to the financial crisis. As home prices steadily increased in the new 
century, it became common for lenders to make mortgage loans to even 
risky, or “subprime,” borrowers. This lending followed a time-tested credit-
card model, in which credit is made easily available and high interest rates 
are charged in order to statistically offset losses. The subprime mortgage-
lending was even regarded by some as more conservative than the credit-
card model because mortgage lenders have not only one way out—cash 
flow—but also a second way out—collateral; and expected home 
appreciation meant that collateral values would increase and borrowers 
would also be able to repay through refinancing.  
 
 This model worked well so long as home prices continued to rise. The 
model was also consistent with the U.S. government’s strong encouragement 
of lenders to make mortgage loans to low-income—and often 
“disproportionately minority”—borrowers. Sometimes the subprime 
mortgage-lending occurred without full documentation of borrower income, 
recognizing, at least implicitly, that many seemingly low-income borrowers 
are actually paid on a cash basis, without officially declaring their income. 
                                                                                                                                                 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1047.pdf (stating that “the crisis was 
unprecedented in its global scale and severity, hindering credit access to businesses, 
households and banks”). 
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To that extent, not completely unlike the argument by renowned Peruvian 
economist Hernando de Soto that de facto property rights should be 
recognized in order to enable the poor to borrow and acquire capital,4 the 
model allowed de facto income to be recognized to enable the poor to 
borrow money and acquire homes. 
 
 But when home prices began declining, these subprime borrowers 
could not refinance; and in many cases, they defaulted. Even borrowers who 
could afford to pay their mortgage loans were tempted to walk away as 
mortgage loans exceeded home values. These mortgage defaults in turn 
caused substantial amounts of low investment-grade mortgage-backed 
securities to default and some AAA-rated securities to be downgraded.5 The 
defaults were especially large for certain highly leveraged securities,6 which 
were indirectly backed by subprime mortgages; full payment of even the 
senior classes of these securities was extremely sensitive to cash-flow 
variations and dependent on the (failed) assumption that housing prices 
would continue to appreciate.7  
 
 These defaults and downgradings of rated securities, in turn, spooked 
investors who believed that AAA meant ironclad safety and that investment 
grade meant relative freedom from default. Investors started losing 
confidence in ratings and avoiding debt securities. Fewer investors meant 
                                                 
4 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE 
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). 
5 For a description of credit ratings and rating agencies, see infra Part II.C.1.  
6 These were called “ABS CDO” securities. 
7 Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 
60 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 549 (2009); also available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1288687. 
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that the price of debt securities started falling. Falling prices meant that firms 
using debt securities as collateral had to mark them to market and put up 
cash8—requiring the sale of more securities—which caused market prices to 
plummet further downward in a death spiral.9 The market prices of 
mortgage-backed securities, for example, collapsed substantially below the 
intrinsic value of the mortgage-loan assets underlying those securities. 
 
 This collapse in market prices meant that banks and other financial 
institutions holding mortgage-backed (and other asset-backed) securities had 
to write down the securities’ value. That caused institutions holding lots of 
these securities—epitomized by Lehman Brothers—to appear more 
financially risky, in turn triggering concern over counterparty risk.10 Afraid 
these institutions might default on their contractual obligations, many parties 
stopped dealing with them.  
 
 The refusal of the U.S. government to save Lehman Brothers in mid-
September 2008, and its resulting bankruptcy, added to the panic. Debt 
markets became so spooked that even the short-term commercial paper 
markets virtually shut down. Without debt-market financing, which 
constitutes approximately 58% of all corporate credit availability,11 
                                                 
8 For a discussion of marking to market, see infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. 
9 The high leverage of many firms appears to have made this death spiral worse. 
Encouraged by the earlier liquidity glut, many firms had borrowed excessively because 
the cost of funds was so cheap. 
10 Counterparty risk refers to the risk that a party obligated on a contract may default 
paying another party to the contract. 
11 Silvio Contessi, Li Li, & Kathryn Russ, Bank vs. Bond Financing Over the Business 
Cycle, 31 ECONOMIC SYNOPSES 1, 1 (2013), available at 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/13/ES_31_2013-11-15.pdf. By comparison, 
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companies lacked money to expand and sometimes even to pay current 
expenses.12 The economy collapsed.  
 
 In short, although the relationship between credit availability and 
financial decline leading to the crisis was somewhat interactive, a loss of 
credit availability appears to have caused the financial crisis more than the 
reverse.13 If that non-standard story is true, what lessons can it teach us? 
 
 II. LESSONS 
 
 I believe there are at least three lessons, all focused on protecting 
credit availability: because credit availability is dependent on financial 
markets as well as banks, regulation should be designed to protect the 
viability of markets as well as banks; more diversified sources of credit 
availability might increase financial stability; and regulators should try to 
identify and correct system-wide flaws in making credit available.    
   
 A. Markets as well as Banks Should be Protected 
                                                                                                                                                 
bank loans make up only about 10% of corporate credit availability. Id. These estimates 
are based on 2003-2013 data. Id. 
12 See, e.g., Fiorella De Fiore & Harald Uhlig, Corporate Debt Structure and the 
Financial Crisis, at 2, https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2012/paper_429.pdf 
(“the implication of the turmoil for economic activity [during the financial crisis] was a 
drop in investment and output that was unprecedented”). 
13 This conclusion appears to be consistent with Hayek’s monetary theory that a 
contraction in bank lending results in declining economic output, unemployment, and a 
recession or even depression. See David Bholat, Money, Bank Debt, and Business Cycles: 
Between Economic Development and Financial Crises, in AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN A TIME OF CRISIS, supra note 3, at 28 (discussing Hayek’s 
monetary theory). 
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 In our market-intermediated financial system where, at least in the 
United States, companies today obtain much of their financing directly 
through capital markets,14 credit availability is dependent on financial 
markets as well as banks. Therefore regulation should be designed to protect 
the viability of markets as well as banks.15 Consider how that could be done.  
 
 Government central banks traditionally have used liquidity, such as 
making emergency loans, to help prevent banks in their country from 
defaulting. The Federal Reserve, for example, has had this role of lender of 
last resort to U.S. banks—although, perversely, the Dodd-Frank Act limited 
the Fed’s power to engage in this role.16 The European Central Bank has 
helped to recapitalize European banks exposed to sovereign-debt risk.17 
                                                 
14 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
15 The efforts being made to protect bank viability are beyond the scope of my Address. 
As a brief summary, though, in the aftermath of the financial crisis the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision adopted new capital-adequacy rules to better absorb and spread 
the effects of losses by banks. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RISK 
MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 2.1-2 (2015). Similarly, post-crisis 
regulation in both the United Kingdom and the United States requires deposit-taking 
banks to adopt forms of “ring-fencing,” restricting risky activities. See Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 69, 78 (2014); also 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228742. In the United Kingdom, ring-fencing for 
banks was first proposed by the 2011 Vickers Report. Id. at 78–79. In the United States, 
ring-fencing is enshrined in the Volcker Rule. Id. at 80–81.  
16 The Dodd-Frank Act sharply limits the power of the Federal Reserve to make 
emergency loans to individual or insolvent financial firms. That categorical limitation 
appears somewhat excessive, if not dangerous; a lender of last resort can be an important 
safeguard if it acts judiciously. 
17 See, e.g., Marius A. Boewe et al., The European Central Debt Crisis – Paving the Way 
Towards Financial Stability, J. BANKR. L. 2012.01-5 (observing that “the European 
Central Bank (“ECB”) started to purchase sovereign debt [from European banks] and 
continued to accept sovereign debt as collateral without haircuts”). 
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Liquidity can also be used to stabilize systemically important financial 
markets.18  
 
 For example, in response to the post-Lehman collapse of the 
commercial paper market, the U.S. Federal Reserve created the Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) to act as a temporary lender of last resort 
for that market, with the goal of addressing “temporary liquidity distortions” 
by purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that could not 
otherwise sell their paper.19 The CPFF apparently helped to stabilize the 
commercial paper market.20  
 
 Regulators should consider institutionalizing liquidity to stabilize 
systemically important financial markets. To mitigate moral hazard, at least 
part of the source of liquidity could be privatized.21 Flexible pricing 
approaches used in structured financing transactions could also be adapted to 
calculate the purchase price of market securities at levels that stabilize 
markets without fostering moral hazard.22 This type of targeted approach to 
                                                 
18 I first proposed this in Systemic Risk, 97 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 193, 225-30 
(2008); also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1008326. 
19 See Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough, & Dina Marchioni, The Federal Reserve’s 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 
423 (April 1, 2010). 
20 Id. at 11 (concluding that “[t]he CPFF indeed had a stabilizing effect on the 
commercial paper market”).   
21 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 
2012 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 815, 829-30; also available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016434.  
22 Id. at 833. For example, assume that the intrinsic value—effectively the present value 
of the expected value of the underlying cash flows—of a type of mortgage-backed 
security is estimated to be in the range of 80 cents on the dollar. If, due to panic, the 
market price of those securities had fallen significantly below that number, say, to 20 
cents on the dollar, a liquidity provider could purchase these securities at, say, 60 cents 
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use liquidity to stabilize panicked financial markets is fundamentally 
different from quantitative easing (“QE”), which refers to a central bank 
purchasing government (and sometimes other) securities as a form of 
monetary policy, in order to hold down interest rates.23  
 
 B. Credit Sources Should be Diversified 
 Diversifying sources of credit availability might increase financial 
stability. My analysis below assumes that each diversified credit source is 
robust and that it does not create an incentive-distorting liquidity glut24 or 
inappropriately weaken central bank control over monetary policy.     
 
 Consider, for example, the European Commission’s proposed Capital 
Markets Union (“CMU”), which has the goal of reforming the European 
financial system to help build an integrated European capital market by 
                                                                                                                                                 
on the dollar, thereby stabilizing the market and still making a profit. To induce a holder 
of the mortgage-backed securities to sell at that price, the liquidity provider could, for 
example, agree to pay a higher deferred purchase price if the securities turn out to be 
worth more than expected. This is just one (simplified) example of the flexible pricing 
approaches used in structured financing transactions to buy financial assets of uncertain 
value which could be adapted to a liquidity provider’s purchases. 
23 The Economist explains: What is quantitative easing?, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/economist-explains-5; 
Larry Elliott, Quantitative easing, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2009), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/oct/14/businessglossary. QE has been used 
extensively by central banks during and after the financial crisis. The logic of QE is 
simple supply and demand: government purchases of securities increases demand (and 
price) for those securities, enabling issuers of the securities to hold down the interest rate 
thereon. See Quantitative easing – Frequently Asked Questions, BANK OF ENGLAND, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/qe/qe_faqs.aspx. 
24 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime 
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 373, 395 (2008); also available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1107444 (discussing how excessively easy credit distorted 
incentives prior to the financial crisis). 
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2019.25 Such a capital market is expected to increase business financing and, 
more relevant to my talk today, to diversify it beyond bank lending26—
which currently represents around 80% of European corporate debt 
financing.27 
 
 The CMU focuses on securitization (in Europe spelled securitisation) 
as one of the central sources of diversified credit. In a typical securitization 
transaction, a sponsor will either originate a pool of loans or other rights to 
payment, or purchase those types of financial assets from other originators 
(such as mortgage lenders), and sell them for cash to a special purpose entity 
(“SPE”). To raise the cash, the SPE issues securities to investors, repayable 
from the periodic financial asset payments. Securitization thus enables 
lenders to multiply their available funding by selling existing loans for cash, 
which can be used to make new loans. Otherwise lenders would have to 
carry the loans on their books and recoup the principal over many years.28      
 
 Used legitimately, securitization became “one of the dominant means 
of capital formation” in the United States and abroad.29 In 2007, for 
                                                 
25 See European Commission, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, SWD 
(2015) 183 final (2015).   
26 See European Commission, Green Paper, Building a Capital Markets Union at 4, 10 
SWD (2015) 13 (final, Feb. 2015). 
27 Kira Brecht, How U.S. and EU Capital Markets are Different (Oct. 29, 2015), available 
at http://openmarkets.cmegroup.com/10431/how-u-s-and-eu-capital-markets-are-
different. 
28 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, What is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 85 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1283, 1295-98 (2012); also available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996670. 
29 Investment Company Act, Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) P 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992) (in which the U.S. Securities and 
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example, the volume of European securitization approximated €595 
billion.30 During that period, the volume of securitization in the United 
States approximated $11.2 trillion.31  
 
 The levels of securitization dropped precipitously, however, with 
recognition that its abuses contributed to the financial crisis. By 2015, for 
example, the volume of European securitization was only €214 billion32 and 
the volume of U.S. securitization was relatively lower, only $1.9 trillion.33 
Securitization’s abuses centered around the highly leveraged securities, 
already mentioned, which were extremely sensitive to cash-flow variations 
and overly dependent on collateral-value assumptions.34  
 
 The revival of securitization—and thus the CMU’s goal to further 
facilitate securitization as a source of capital market financing—will depend 
on preventing future such abuses. To accomplish that, the European 
Commission is proposing a framework for what it calls simple, transparent, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Exchange Commission described securitization as “becoming one of the dominant means 
of capital formation in the United States”). 
30 Association of Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), Securitisation Data Report for 
Q1 2016, at 7, available at www.afme.eu. 
31 This figure is based on data for 2008 from the Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association website, http://www.sifma.org/. 
32 AFME, supra note 30. 
33 Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association Press Release, “SIFMA Issues 
2015 Securitization Year in Review” (Apr. 7, 2016), available at 
http://www.sifma.org/newsroom/2016/sifma-issues-2015-securitization-year-in-review/. 
34 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Cf. What is Securitization?, supra note 28, at 
1285 (discussing why these securities defaulted or had their credit ratings downgraded). 
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and standardised (“STS”) securitization, which is designed to increase 
reliability and investor confidence.35   
 
 C. System-Wide Flaws Should be Identified and Corrected 
 Regulators should try to identify and correct system-wide flaws in 
making credit available. Consider the following potential flaws. 
 
 1. Overreliance on Credit Ratings.  A credit rating is a formal 
assessment of a borrower’s ability to pay its debts, expressed by private for-
profit companies—known as “rating agencies”—through an ordinal ranking 
system.36 In general, the higher the rating, the more likely the borrower is to 
pay its liabilities.37 Because of their simplicity and public availability, credit 
ratings can perform a public good, helping to close the information gap 
between borrowers and lenders.38 Further, credit ratings also serve a de facto 
“certification” function by allowing investors to compare the 
creditworthiness of debt securities with different risk characteristics.39  
 
                                                 
35 See European Commission, Capital Markets Union: First Status Report, SWD (2016) 
147 final, at 21 (Apr. 25, 2016). I have elsewhere argued that the United States should 
adopt a similar securitization framework. See Securitization and Post-Crisis Financial 
Regulation, 101 CORNELL L REV. ONLINE 115, 125-26 & 138 (2016). 
36 PRAGYAN DEB, MARK MANNING, GARETH MURPHY, ADRIAN PENALVER & ARON TOTH, 
BANK OF ENG., WHITHER THE CREDIT RATINGS INDUSTRY? 4 (2011), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/fspapers/fs_paper09.p
df. For example, Moody’s represents the most creditworthy instruments as Aaa, the next 
most creditworthy as Aa, then to A, then to Baa, and so on. Ratings Definitions, 
MOODY’S, https://www.moodys.com/Pages/amr002002.aspx.  
37 DEB ET AL., supra note 36, at 4. The highest rated securities are deemed “investment-
grade,” while the lowest rated are called “non-investment grade,” or “junk.” Bond 
ratings, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/investment-products/fixed-
income-bonds/bond-ratings 
38 See DEB ET AL., supra note 36, at 4.  
39 Id. at 5–6. 
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 Investors both in the United States and abroad came to rely on credit 
ratings as simple tools to assist in making investment decisions.40 Because of 
their widespread use,41 however, many investors overrelied on credit ratings. 
Prior to the financial crisis, for example, investors often relied exclusively 
on credit ratings without performing independent credit examinations.42 
Such exclusive reliance reflected a faith “in the accuracy of credit ratings 
[that] was reinforced by their long record of reliability for assessing the 
creditworthiness of borrowers under relatively simple debt instruments, such 
as corporate bonds and basic securitization instruments.”43  
 
 This faith remained steadfast even as credit ratings were applied to 
much more complex, highly leveraged, and novel instruments, such as ABS 
CDO securities,44 without historical performance data.45 But the faith was 
badly shaken when “the rating methodologies utilized for . . . [those] 
securities produced inaccurate ratings.”46 The resulting loss of investor 
confidence caused a collapse of the market for virtually all debt securities, 
and a corresponding collapse of credit.47     
 
This overreliance on credit ratings even when extrapolated far beyond 
their normal use, and the resulting collapse of credit caused by the loss of 
                                                 
40 Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 
2002 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 1, 3. 
41 See id.  
42 See Steven L. Schwarcz & Lucy Chang, The Custom to Failure Cycle, 62 DUKE LAW 
JOURNAL 767, 773 (2012) (“at least until the global financial crisis, financial firms rarely 
questioned the accuracy of [credit] ratings”).  
43 Id. 
44 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (defining these securities). 
45 Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 42, at 773–75.  
46 Id. at 777. 
47 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
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faith in ratings even when normally applied, illustrates a system-wide flaw 
in making credit available. How can regulators try to correct this flaw?   
 
 One approach might be to require “periodic self-awareness and 
reporting” from the financial community of the limitations of credit ratings 
and their potential for failure.48 This requirement would be especially 
valuable when extrapolating existing ratings methodologies to novel 
financial products.49  
 
 Another approach might be simply to try to demystify credit ratings, 
reducing the blind faith that can cause overreliance. The Dodd-Frank Act 
implicitly attempts to do that by requiring the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission to adopt new rules requiring disclosure of rating 
methodologies,50 thereby increasing the transparency of the rating process. 
This enables investors themselves to better understand the limitations, as 
well as benefits, of credit ratings.51 
 
                                                 
48 Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 42, at 783. A similar requirement was passed as part of 
the Basel III capital adequacy guidelines, whereby banks are required “to engage in 
periodic financial ‘stress’ scenarios, in order to motivate them to consider the possibility 
of, and to better prepare for, future periods when previously adequate liquidity and 
capital resources might prove inadequate.” Id. at 782–83. Further, the Dodd-Frank Act 
“requires banks and other systemically important financial institutions to plan for the 
possibility of their liquidation.” Id. at 783.   
49 Id.  
50 Credit Rating Agencies, SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/creditratingagencies.shtml.  
51 See Gregory A. Fernicola & Joshua B. Goldstein, Credit Rating Agencies, SKADDEN, at 
1–2, https://www.skadden.com/newsletters/FSR_Credit_Rating_Agencies.pdf (“To 
increase transparency in the ratings process, rating agencies will be required to use a 
standardized form to publicly disclose their rating methodology, a description of issuer 
data considered in the rating process and any additional information that the SEC may 
require.”).  
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 2. Marking-to-Market in Crisis Conditions.  Marking-to-market is 
widely considered to protect against declines in market value. In turbulent or 
panicked markets, however, it can reduce credit availability and exacerbate 
the panic.  
 
 In its simplest form, marking-to-market refers to the common 
regulatory requirement that a securities account be adjusted in response to a 
change in the market value of the securities.52 An investor, for example, may 
buy securities on credit from a securities broker-dealer, securing the 
purchase price by pledging the securities as collateral. To guard against the 
price of the securities falling to the point where their value as collateral is 
insufficient to repay the purchase price, the broker-dealer requires the 
investor to maintain a minimum collateral value. If the market value of the 
securities falls below this minimum, the broker-dealer will issue a “margin 
call” requiring the investor to deposit additional collateral, usually in the 
form of money or additional securities, to satisfy this minimum. Failure to 
do so triggers a default, enabling the broker-dealer to foreclose on the 
collateral.53  
 
 Requiring investors to “mark to market” in this fashion is generally 
believed to reduce risk.54 Nonetheless, it can cause “perverse effects on 
                                                 
52 This discussion of marking-to-market is based on Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating 
Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 211, 232-
33 (2009); also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1240863. 
53 Id. See also ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 71–72 (8th ed. 
2008). 
54 See, e.g., Gikas A. Hardouvelis & Panayiotis Theodossiou, The Asymmetric 
Relationship Between Initial Margin Requirements and Stock Market Volatility Across 
Bull and Bear Markets, 15 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 1525, 1554–55 (2002) 
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systemic stability” during times of market volatility, when forcing sales of 
assets to meet margin calls can depress asset prices, requiring more forced 
sales (which, in turn, will depress asset prices even more), causing a 
downward spiral.55 The existence of leverage makes this spiral more likely 
and amplifies it if it occurs.56 At least some portion of the financial crisis 
appears to have resulted from this downward spiral.57 
 
 Marking-to-market’s inadvertent undermining of financial stability is 
due in part to nonlinear feedback effects and tight coupling.58 Nonlinearity 
results when “interactions among components of a system are not directly 
proportional.”59 Similarly, a “tightly coupled system is one that is highly 
interdependent, so that a disturbance to one part of the system can spread 
almost instantaneously to other parts of the system.”60 In a downward 
                                                                                                                                                 
(finding a correlation between higher margin calls and decreased systemic risk, and 
speculating that higher margin calls may bleed the irrationality out of the market until 
only sound bets are left). 
55 Rodrigo Cifuentes, Gianluigi Ferrucci & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity Risk and 
Contagion 2 (Bank of Eng. Working Paper No. 264, 2005), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ publications/workingpapers/wp264.pdf); see also 
Clifford De Souza & Mikhail Smirnov, Dynamic Leverage: A Contingent Claims 
Approach to Leverage for Capital Conservation, JOURNAL OF PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, 
Fall 2004, at 25, 28 (arguing that, in a bad market, short-term pressure to sell assets to 
raise cash for margin calls can lead to further mark-to-market losses for remaining assets, 
which triggers a whole new wave of selling, the process repeating itself until markets 
improve or the firm is wiped out; and referring to this process as a “Critical Liquidation 
Cycle”). 
56 De Souza & Smirnov, supra note 55, at 26–27. 
57 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. See also Rachel Evans, Banks Tell of 
Downward Spiral, 27 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW 16 (June 2008). 
58 Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 52, at 232–33.  
59 Virginia R. Burkett et al., Nonlinear Dynamics in Ecosystem Response to Climactic 
Change: Case Studies and Policy Implications, 2 JOURNAL OF ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY 
357, 359 (2005). 
60 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the 
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 75, 94 (2013).  
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spiraling asset market, then, the very fact of forced sale of marked-to-market 
assets causes the market value of those assets to fall even further, in turn 
requiring more marking-to-market.61 This can create the type of “anomaly, 
seen during the [financial] crisis, of securities bearing market values 
substantially below their intrinsic values.”62 
 
 Regulators could reduce marking-to-market’s flaws by addressing the 
nonlinear feedback effects and tight coupling that cause them. To reduce 
nonlinear feedback, for example, regulators could “allow firms to substitute 
other measures of investor comfort for marking-to-market”63 when marking-
to-market “might distort value, such as when it would require a securities 
account—especially an account whose securities have long-term 
maturities—to be adjusted in response to short-term pricing fluctuations.”64 
One such measure of investor comfort might be a firm’s “full disclosure of 
its underlying asset portfolio.”65 And to reduce marking-to-market’s tight 
coupling, regulators could use liquidity to stabilize systemically important 
financial markets impacted by a downward spiraling asset market.66 Such 
                                                 
61 Cf. RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, 
AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 146 (2007) (observing that “the natural 
reaction to [financial] market breakdown is to add layers of protection and regulation. But 
trying to regulate a market entangled by complexity can lead to unintended 
consequences, compounding crises rather than extinguishing them because the safeguards 
add even more complexity, which in turn feeds more failure.”). 
62 Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 52, at 247. 
63 Id. at 246.  
64 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 119. 
65 Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 52, at 246–47. 
66 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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liquidity might be provided by the type of market lender of last resort 
previously discussed.67  
 
 3. Inherent Human Limitations.  I have so far discussed system-wide 
flaws in making credit available that are part of the design of the financial 
system. In theory at least, the system can be redesigned to correct them. 
Another type of system-wide flaw is much more intractable: our inherent 
human limitations.68  
 
 For example, we often implicitly simplify our perception of reality as 
a psychological coping mechanism, including a tendency to define future 
events by the recent past. This flaw has particular application to credit 
availability. In this context, consider certain parallels between the Great 
Depression and the financial crisis, which illustrate how the flaw might 
temporarily increase but ultimately destroy credit availability.  
 
 In the years preceding the Great Depression, banks lending “on 
margin”—a practice in which borrowers use proceeds of a loan to purchase 
shares of stock and then pledge that stock as collateral to the banks—
assumed they were adequately protected, even for margin loans made to 
                                                 
67 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Cf. Regulating Complexity in Financial 
Markets, supra note 52, at 246–47 (discussing using such a market liquidity provider to 
“more loosely couple the feedback effects”) & at 247–56 (generally discussing providing 
liquidity to systemically important financial markets). 
68 For a more comprehensive discussion of how human limitations can impair financial 
regulation, see Steven L. Schwarcz, “Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations on 
Legal Efficacy” (draft on file with author). 
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risky borrowers.69 Although these loans were not initially 
overcollateralized—because the value of the pledged stock initially equaled, 
but did not exceed, the amount of the loan—banks expected the stock market 
to continue rising, as it had for decades. That expectation reflects the 
tendency to define future events by the recent past. An increase in stock 
prices, and thus a consequent increase in the value of the collateral, would 
then cause the loans to become overcollateralized.70 Beginning in October 
1929, however, the decline in stock prices caused many of those risky 
borrowers to default on their now-undercollateralized margin loans.71 That, 
in turn, caused margin-lending banks to begin defaulting, triggering a 
banking collapse that ultimately wiped out credit. 
 
 Similarly, prior to the financial crisis, institutions that made mortgage 
loans to subprime borrowers assumed, as mentioned, that they were 
adequately protected.72 They expected housing prices to continue rising, as 
had been the case for decades.73 That expectation again reflects the tendency 
to define future events by the recent past. An increase in housing prices, and 
thus a consequent increase in the value of the collateral, would then cause 
the loans to become overcollateralized.74 In the fall of 2007, however, the 
decline in housing prices caused many subprime borrowers to begin 
                                                 
69 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an 
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1349, 1356 (2011); also available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735025.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1357. 
72 Id. at 1359–60. 
73 Id. 
74 Barry Ritholtz, Case Shiller 100 Year Chart (2011 Update), BIG PICTURE (Apr. 13, 
2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2011/04/case-shiller-100-year-chart-2011-
update. 
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defaulting on their now-undercollateralized mortgage loans.75 As 
discussed,76 that started the timeline of events that caused the shutdown of 
debt markets and the resulting financial crisis.  
 
 We do not yet, and may never, understand our human limitations well 
enough to correct them. If we cannot correct these limitations, they will 
continue to threaten credit unavailability and resulting financial crises.  
 
 III. CONCLUSION 
 
 Although the standard story is that the financial crisis resulted in the 
loss of credit availability, I have argued that a loss of credit availability 
appears to have caused the financial crisis more than the reverse. If that 
argument is correct, what lessons can it teach us? 
 
 There are at least three. First, in our market-intermediated financial 
system, credit availability is dependent on financial markets as well as 
banks. Therefore financial regulation should be designed to protect the 
viability of markets as well as banks. Second, diversifying credit sources 
might increase financial stability. Third, we should try to identify and correct 
system-wide flaws that can undermine credit availability.  
 
                                                 
75 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 69, at 1360 (“When home prices began falling, 
some of these asset-backed securities began defaulting, requiring financial institutions 
heavily invested in these securities to write down their value, causing these institutions to 
appear, if not be, financially risky.” (citation omitted)). 
76 See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text. 
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 One of the most intractable of these flaws is our own inherent human 
limitations, which we can do little to correct. That suggests an ongoing risk 
for credit availability, and thus an ongoing potential for new financial crises 
to arise. Although addressing that risk and crisis-potential is a story for 
another day, Professor Iman Anabtawi and I begin to address it in a separate 
article.77 Because financial failure is inevitable, we argue that financial 
regulation should be designed not only to prevent failures but also to work 
ex post—after a systemic shock has been triggered and is being 
transmitted—to try to stabilize the afflicted financial system. Our approach 
takes inspiration from chaos theory, insofar as that theory holds that 
remedies should also focus on limiting the consequences of failures. 
                                                 
77 Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 
TEXAS LAW REVIEW 75 (2013); also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2271587. 
